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Analogy and Pursuitworthiness
1. Introduction
One of the main debates today concerning analogies in science is between formal and material
approaches to analogical reasoning.
According  to  the  material  view,  defended  most  prominently  by  John  Norton,
analogical  inferences  are  warranted  by  concrete  empirical  knowledge  about  the  specific
domain in which they are applied. Nothing interesting depends on formal similarities between
analogical inferences used in different scientific domains. Proponents of the material view
argue that attempts at formulating universally applicable formal inference schemas are either
(a) too vague to distinguish between good and bad analogical inferences or (b) rely so heavily
on context-dependent empirical information that the formal aspects become irrelevant.1
One response to this challenge, recommended by Paul Bartha, is to meet it head-on
and defend an inference schema which avoids these objections. As he points out, although
some aspects  of  analogical  inference  might  depend on material  background assumptions,
there is no reason not to explore how much can be captured by formal schemata.2 Below I will
look specifically at Bartha's own proposed two-dimensional inference-schema for analogical
reasoning.3
The aim of this paper is to highlight a lacuna in the debate. Both sides in this debate
focus on analogies as a means to justify  accepting  a hypothesis to some degree or other. I
argue  that  analogies  in  science  in  science  play  another  important  role,  namely to  justify
pursuing hypotheses. I'll argue that both Norton's and Bartha's account, as they stand, do not
give us a plausible account of how analogies justify pursuit. I then present my own account of
1 Norton (manuscript); cf. Norton (2003) and Brigandt (2010).
2 Bartha (2013, §2.4).
3 Bartha (2010).
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how analogies justify pursuit,  and show how analogies on this account can justify pursuit
independently of whether they can also justify acceptance. 
2. Acceptance and Pursuit
Let me start  by explaining how I see the difference between acceptance and pursuit.4 By
“accepting a hypothesis”, I simply mean to have some positive epistemic attitude towards it.
Acceptance  comes  in  different  forms  and  degrees,  depending  on  the  specific  epistemic
attitude. So one can accept it as true, as empirically adequate, as the most likely, or merely as
plausible. Common to these is that in order to justify accepting a hypothesis in any of these
ways, one has to reason about what to believe about the world (or the  observable  world, if
you're an empiricist).
To pursue a hypothesis, on the other hand, is to do things like (i) testing and refining it
empirically; (ii) developing it theoretically; (iii) exploring its possible uses and applications.
The important point here is that justifying the pursuit of one hypothesis rather than another
involves practical reasoning about which course of action to follow.
It is important to distinguish efforts to justify pursuit from the so-called “context of
discovery”.  The  latter  is  typically  taken  to  regard  the  question  of  how to  “discover”  or
generate  hypotheses  for  scientific  research,  prior  to  any  efforts  at  justifying  them.  The
problem in justifying pursuit, by contrast, concerns how to best prioritise the limited resources
available  for  scientific  research.  Such  choices  both  can  and  ought  to  be  justified.  Like
justification for acceptance, this presupposes that one has thought of candidate hypotheses for
pursuit in the first place. I'll return to this conception of justification for pursuit below.
4 The distinction between acceptance and pursuit was formulated in those terms by Laudan (1977: 106-114). 
For more recent discussion see Whitt (1990) and Šešelja, Kosolosky & Straßer (2012).
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3. The Material View
Norton's material account of analogy is based on what he calls  facts of analogy. These state
that some specific similarity obtain between two kinds of phenomena, where the exact nature
of the similarity is  stated as part  of the fact.  Analogical inferences are then simply those
inferences which rely on facts of analogy. A typical analogical inference may look like this:
(N1) Systems S1 and S2 have similarity X. [Fact of analogy].
(N2) S1 has property a.
Therefore:
(N3) S2 has property a'.
In some cases these premise will be strong enough to warrant a straightforward deductive
inference. At other times we need to invoke further premises or make some sort of contextual
judgement about whether it is reasonable to accept the conclusion in light of the premises. We
may also only assert  the fact of analogy with some degree of hesitation,  e.g. as  likely or
merely  possible,  in  which  case  we  would  typically  carry  this  qualification  on  the  to
conclusion:
(N1*) It is likely that systems S1 and S2 have similarity X.
(N2) S1 has property a.
Therefore:
(N3*) It is likely that S2 has property a'.
The  upshot  of  the  material  view  is  that  all  of  this  will  depend  on  background
knowledge about the specific domain where the inference is made. So we can explain why
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any particular individual analogical inference is reasonable or not, by looking at the domain-
specific background knowledge. But, argues Norton, there isn't going to be any practically
usable general account of analogical reasoning which can distinguish between good and bad
inferences across different scientific domains. Thus, these inferences aren't so much warranted
by  the  analogy between  the  two  systems,  as  simply  the  relevant  pieces  of  background
knowledge, some of which happens to be about facts of analogy.
For  my  purposes,  however,  the  crucial  point  is  that  this  account  is  focused  on
acceptance.  Norton  conceives  of  analogies  as  premises  in  inferences  concerning  what  to
believe about the world. But in many cases,  analogies aren't used as premises at  end  of an
investigation to infer conclusions about the target phenomenon. Rather, they are used as a
starting point for the development and empirical testing of theories and models. 
In fact, several of the cases Norton (manuscript, 4) cites as examples of how analogies
have often “proven quite fertile in the history of science” seem to be of this type. Take for
instance  the  development  of  the  liquid  drop  model  of  the  atomic  nucleus  in  the  1930s.
Physicists at this time faced the problem that the single-particle methods they had used so far
were intractable for the many-body problem represented by heavy nuclei. As Norton describes
the  situation,  the  physicists  noticed  that  the  nucleons  “seemed  something  like  the  many
molecules clustered together in a liquid drop” (19). But this (fairly weak) observation did not
in itself lead physicists to conclude anything about atomic nuclei. They did however try and
apply the same modelling techniques as were typically used for liquid drops. In other words,
the  analogy  here  seems  to  have  justified  pursuing  this  modelling  strategy.  This  is  also
reflected in how Norton describes the situation: “The  hope  was that the physics of drops
might also coincide with at least some of the physics of nuclei” (ibid., emphases added).
Norton does recognise that the inferences in many of the cases he analyses are at best
very weak. He remarks that in some cases analogical facts “may be merely conjectured or,
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better, may be explored empirically” (13) and that “If we doubt the strength of the inference
and wish to refine our assessment, we … [would] engage in empirical investigations of the
fact of analogy” (14). One might read this as suggesting that our background knowledge in
these cases only justify conjecturing a fact of analogy, which we can then pursue. 
But  this  doesn't  answer  the  question  of  why  scientists  should  conjecture  and
investigate an analogical hypothesis instead of any other hypothesis we might think of.5 In the
cases Norton cites the analogy seems to have played an important role in justifying the pursuit
of a particular line of investigation, but as it stands his account does not address this aspect of
analogical reasoning.
A possible reply might be our that our background knowledge suffices to show the
analogy more plausible, and that this makes it reasonable to pursue it. However, the problem
is that we are often lacking background knowledge about the domains we want to investigate.
With background knowledge as sparse as in the case of the liquid drop model, it is doubtful
that this suffices to show the analogy more plausible than the countless other hypotheses we
might pursue. Furthermore, as I will argue later, plausibility on its own is not sufficient to
justify pursuit.
4. The Two-dimensional Account
First,  let  me  look  at  Bartha's  account.  This  is  based  on the  two-dimensional  analysis  of
analogical inferences, first proposed by Mary Hesse (1963). The point here is that analogical
inferences are not just based on the “horizontal relations”, i.e. the similarities and differences
between the source and target system. They also depend on the “vertical relations”, consisting
of the causal or explanatory relations, within the two domains (fig. 1 below).
5 A similar argument is made by the “Campbellian” in the opening dialogue of Hesse's in Models and 
Analogies in Science (1963: 37).
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(Fig. 1, adapted with changes from Bartha 2010: 25)
Building  on  these  this  idea,  Bartha  defends  an  inference-schema  which  can  be
summarised as follows:
(B1)  There  is  some  causal  or  explanatory  relation  R(a,  b,  c,  ...) between
features a, b, c … of S1. [Prior association]
(B2)  S2  has  one  or  more  features  a',  b',  c',  …  analogous  to  a,  b,  c,  …
[Potential for generalisation].
(B3) S2 does not have any features which would preclude R' (analogous to R)
from obtaining. [No critical difference].
Therefore: 
(B4) It  is  prima facie  plausible that  R'(a',  b',  c',  …) obtains for S2, and  a
fortiori that S2 has features a', b', c', ...
The first premise states that there is some “prior association” in the source system, in the form
of some causal or explanatory relation between its features. Second, we look at whether there
is a “potential for generalisation”, meaning that the target system has some features analogous
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to those features involved in the prior association. Finally, we need to consider whether there
are any “critical differences” between the two systems, i.e. whether S2 has any features which
would  preclude  a  relation  analogous to  the prior  association from obtaining.  Given these
premises, Bartha argues, it is  prima facie  plausible to “transfer” the prior association to the
target system, and thus infer that the relevant further analogical features.
As you can see, Bartha only claims that analogical inferences following this schema
show  a  hypothesis  prima  facie  plausible.6 He  takes  this  to  mean  (roughly):  “There  are
sufficient grounds for taking  p  seriously” (2010: 16). This is partly an  epistemic notion: A
plausible  hypothesis, for Bartha, “has epistemic support: we have some reason to believe it,
even prior to testing” (2010: 15). (In probabilistic contexts, he explicates this a having a non-
negligible  prior  probability).  But  Bartha  also  mentions  that  plausibility  judgements  have
pragmatic connotations: 
“To say that  a  hypothesis  is  plausible  typically  implies  that  we have  good
reason to investigate it (subject to the feasibility and value of investigation)”
(ibid.). 
So Bartha seems to think that analogies can be used to justify accepting hypotheses, in the
weak sense of regarding it as plausible, but also recognises that they can justify pursuing it. 
In practice, however he only focuses on acceptance. In a suggestive footnote (2010:
18,  note  19)  Bartha  mentions  that  the  point  about  pursuit  depends  on  the  acceptance-
dimension  “in  a  decision-theoretic  sense”  given  “contextual  information  about  costs  and
6 As an inspiration for this focus, Bartha cites N. R. Campbell's defence of analogies in science. Campbell 
argued that theories would be completely “valueless and unworthy of the name” (1920/1957: 129) without 
analogies, since only these distinguish theories “from the multitude of others [...] which might also be 
proposed to explain the same laws” (ibid., 142). This is however almost certainly a misinterpretation of 
Campbell, who insisted that the value of analogies is a completely personal and arbitrary matter of what we 
happen to find intellectually satisfying. Although Campbell considered this kind of value very important, he 
nowhere connects it to plausibility or likeliness.
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benefits”.  He however goes on to say absent this information “the two points are at  least
partially  independent”.  As  far  as  I  can  tell,  Bartha  does  not  expand  on  this  connection
elsewhere. As I am reading Bartha here, he seems to be assuming that the primary role of
analogies in justifying pursuit is to show the hypothesis plausible. Once this is established,
whether  we are  furthermore justified in  pursuing it  depends solely information about  the
feasibility, costs and value of doing so. He seems to regard this information as independent of
the analogical inference itself, and thus in this sense “contextual”.
In my view, there two problems with this  picture of how analogies justify pursuit.
Firstly,  I'm not  convinced by Bartha's  arguments  that  his  inference-schema can generally
justify  regarding  hypotheses  as  plausible.  Secondly,  I  think  analogies  can  play  a  role  in
justifying pursuit  even if  they don't make hypotheses any more plausible. I'm not going to
argue the first point in much detail. I'll just look at one of Bartha's arguments, since it fits
nicely into my account of justification for pursuit.
5. Analogies and Unification
The argument I'm interested in is Bartha's (2010, ch. 7) argument that hypotheses based on
analogy tends to promote many of the so-called “non-empirical theoretical virtues”, that is,
things such as coherence, simplicity, and unification.7 I'm just going to focus on unification
here, which is also the one Bartha places the most weight on.
The form of unification Bartha is interested is Phillip Kitcher's (1989) notion, where
we  achieve  more  unification  if  we  can  explain  many  different  phenomena  using  a  few
explanatory schemas.  Let  us return to  Bartha's  inference-schema.  The first  premise (prior
association) states that we have a certain explanation of certain features of S1. The second
premise (potential for generalisation) states that S2 has a number of analogous features. Since
7 That these theoretical virtues play an important role in theory choice was argued in Thomas Kuhn's (1977) 
influential essay. Bartha also draws on Wesley Salmon's (1990) Bayesian reconstruction of this point.
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there is no critical difference (premise three), it seems possible to explain the features of S2
with the same explanatory schema as used in S1. So if we can indeed transfer this explanation
from S1 to S2, we will have unified the two systems under a common explanatory schema.
Thus, by adopting the hypothesis that the prior association can be transferred we will have
increased  the  overall  unification  of  our  explanations,  and  the  greater  the  potential  for
generalisation, the greater the gain in unification.
Now, in order for this to be an argument that analogies justify acceptance we have to
furthermore  assume that  getting  more  unification  gives  us  a  good reason to  think  that  a
hypothesis is plausible. But this is a controversial assumption. In particular, a proponent of the
material  view would  point  out  that  we don't  have  any reason to  think  that  the  world  is
generally, across all scientific domains, unified in this sense. Whether any particular kind of
unification gives us reason to accept a hypothesis will depend on our background knowledge
about specific domains.
What I want to argue now is that,  even if we don't think unification gives us a good
reason to accept hypotheses, we can still use this line of argument to show that analogies
justify pursuit.8
6. Unification and Justification for Pursuit 
To argue this, I need to introduce my preferred account of justification for pursuit. The basic
idea is similar to what Bartha seems to have in mind: Justifying pursuit is basically a decision-
theoretic  problem where  we  have  to  figure  out  how to  get  the  most  out  of  the  limited
resources – time, money, equipment, etc. – available for doing science.9
More specifically, we should be weighing our hypotheses in terms of things like:
8 Bartha at some points suggests that we can interpret this argument as only showing that the analogy gives us 
a reason to investigate a hypothesis further. Most of his discussion however clearly aims at showing that 
analogies can justify acceptance. As mentioned above, Bartha does not say very much about how he sees the 
relation between plausibility and having reasons for investigating a hypothesis.
9 This conception goes back to C. S. Peirce's writings on abduction. See McKaughan 2008 for a detailed 
argument that Peircean abduction is concerned with pursuit rather than acceptance. 
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a) The expected costs of pursuing them.
b) How  interesting or valuable  it would be to learn that the hypotheses are
true or false.
c) How likely we are to get reliable evidence for or against the hypotheses.
d) How likely we are to get misleading evidence.
e) How plausible we think the hypothesis is prior to pursuing it.
f) Other possible outcomes, besides learning whether the hypothesis is true.
Looking at these factors, Bartha seems to be assuming that analogical inferences primarily
justify pursuit through raising (e), the plausibility of the hypothesis. But on the conception
advocated here, this is not the only way to justify pursuit. In many cases, my suspicion is that
relying on analogies is primarily a way of reducing (a) the expected costs  of pursuit:  By
pursuing a modelling strategy already known to work elsewhere we avoid having to develop
new modelling techniques from scratch. But for the remainder of this section, I want instead
to focus on (b), the value of learning whether the hypothesis is true or false. 
There are of course many kinds of value with associated learning this, but let us focus
on what can reasonably be called intellectual or cognitive value. So let us bracket things like
purely moral, political, aesthetic, etc. value. Even then, we are arguably still concerned with
more than merely truth and falsity. Here is how Kitcher (1993: 94) makes the point:
“Nobody is interested in the minutiae of the shapes and colors of the objects in
your  vicinity,  the  temperature  fluctuations  in  your  microenvironment,  the
infinite  number  of  disjunctions  you  can  generate  with  your  favorite  true
statement as one disjunct, or the probabilities of the events in the many chance
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setups  you  can  contrive  with  objects  in  your  vicinity.  What  we  want  is
significant truth.”
In particular, Kitcher highlights unification as a cognitive value we should be concerned with
beyond mere truth, in the same sense that Bartha appeals to in his argument above. 
With this in mind, let us return to Bartha's argument from the last section, but interpret
it  as aiming to show that analogies can justify pursuit.  Let  accept Bartha's  argument that
analogies  tend  to  promote  unification,  and  furthermore  assume,  with  Kitcher,  that  it  is
generally more valuable to know whether a unifying hypothesis is true. We can thus conclude
that analogies tend to lead us to hypotheses that it would be more intellectually valuable to
know whether are true. On my account of justification for pursuit, this is sufficient to show
that analogies justify pursuit, independently of whether they also raises the plausibility of the
hypothesis.10
7. Conclusion
My aim  in  this  paper  have  been  to  argue  that  analogies  often  play  the  interesting  and
important  role  of  justifying  pursuit,  and  that  this  role  need  not  dependent  on  whether
analogical inferences  also justify accepting a hypothesis  to some degree or other.  It  is  of
course possible that they can also play the latter role, but it is a mistake to simply assume all
uses of analogy in science aims to show a hypothesis more likely or plausible.
10 This assumes that the analogy does not lower the plausibility of the hypothesis. In general, if a given 
inference changes our estimates of more than one of (a)-(f), whether it raises our justification for pursuit will
depend on the details of how we weigh these factors against each other. Exploring these issues is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
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